The incident at Forsmark 1 did not come near a meltdown, no emissions to
the environment occurred as a consequence of the event, and the number of safety
systems that were activated proved sufficient. A comprehensive evaluation put
the event at 2 on the seven-point INES scale.
The most serious aspect of the incident in SKI's view is that safety
systems that should have been independent of one another were not sufficiently
So the fearmongering - shock horror! - was baseless. Not only that but it turns out the flaw was a failure to follow the principles of defense-in-depth wth its multiple, independent redundancy. Proper application of defense-in-depth would have prevented all the panic. There is nothing wrong with the principles of nuclear engineering. They just have to be followed.
And even then, the designers of Forsmark-1 still did a good enough job that this error failed to ultimately jeopardise safety in any serious way.